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THE POLITICS OF CROSS BORDER DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Robert K. Rae
It is always, I think, a good idea to tell people where you are coming from
in a personal sense. In my observation of all kinds of law and, certainly, of
trade law, where you are depends a lot on where you sit, where you have
been, and what your interests are. I grew up both in Canada and in the United
States. I spent much of my childhood and schooling days in Washington,
D.C. I was Richard Nixon's newspaper boy. I was also Estes Kefauver's
newspaper boy and Estes Kefauver was a much better tipper than Richard
Nixon. I can tell you that.
I led a political party in Ontario and was involved federally as well as
provincially.' I became Premier of Ontario during the worst recession since
the 1930s. Some people say that was because I was there. Well, it started
before I got there, and it ended towards the end of my term. I was defeated in
1995 and retired from politics in 1996. I have since become a member of the
law firm of Goodman, Phillips & Vineberg. Since there are so many other
lawyers here, I will say no more than that, except that I have been retained
for the last year and a half as counsel to the Free Trade Lumber Council.
This is a group of companies that are extensively engaged in trying to
persuade the Canadian government that we should not be looking to another
period of managed trade with respect to softwood lumber. Inevitably and
invariably, that brings me in contact with a great many people in the United
States. I come at the issue with all the baggage that you see.
I understand that Mr. Blanchard had some things to say on the subject of
softwood lumber. Jim is a good friend of mine. He is also in a well-known
Washington law firm, which has been retained by the British Columbia
Trade Lumber Council. They have a slightly different perspective on life
than the Free Trade Lumber Council. I gather he expressed a somewhat
different perspective, which is fine. I am sorry he is not here so we could
actually have an exchange. I did want to concentrate on the question of
softwood lumber sometime during my remarks. It is going to be the most
serious trade dispute or trade issue between Canada and the United States in
the near future, since it does represent such an enormous volume of trade
between our two countries.
I Robert Rae led the New Democratic Party in Ontario from 1982 to 1996.
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As someone who has from a very early day been naturally involved in
cross border questions, transborder issues, political issues, and the
relationship between Canada and the United States, let me make a couple of
observations which may be obvious or may not even be true, depending on
your point of view.
The first one is that trade is far more important to Canada than it is to the
United States. It is important that we always remember in the hard economic
sense, access to the United States market is absolutely critical for Canada.
We have become even more trade dependent in the last ten years than we
were in the 1970s and 1980s. The statistics that people often use are already
out of date. I would suspect that well over ninety percent of our exports are
now related to the American market. I would think that with respect to
Ontario's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), well over half of our GDP now
depends on trade. So we can see the level of integration speeding up and
becoming even more significant. It is not that trade does not matter to the
United States. Obviously, it does. We know that very well. It is just that
Canadians need to be instinctively aware of the importance of our access to
the United States and the world market as being critical for our standard of
living.
The second is the understandable annoyance of Americans with
Canadians' preoccupation with being noticed. The outstanding experience
that Canadians feel is that of having survived the insufferable arrogance of
one empire for a couple of hundred of years, when they did not have a clue
who we were nor did they care. I once had a meeting with a British Cabinet
Minister, I do not think it was my fault entirely, in which he actually fell
asleep in the middle of our meeting. Canadians now face the question, as we
enter into a new quasi-imperial relationship, of whether we are going to get
noticed in this instance as well. Getting the attention of the United States has
constantly been a preoccupation of policy makers in Canada and it would
appear that we only get attention when things go wrong or when there is an
unusual amount of noise in the attic.
The third is that neither Canada nor the United States are completely
consistent with respect to the linkage between what people say and what
people do. I am a recovering politician, and I am almost completely cured,
but I do not find it surprising, especially in trade matters, that one would see
this gap. It is a gap that is shared on both sides of the border. People speak
the language and rhetoric of free trade of open markets, of competition; it
depends on whose ox is getting gored and what particular industry is being
affected, very suddenly one sees practices which are not completely
consistent. We all want better access for our goods and services. In Canada,
we have a fear of being swamped by those of others. Clearly, in the United
[Vol. 26:63 2000]
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States, there are particular industries and particular interests, which have
done a remarkably good job of ensuring that they would not be "swamped"
by those of others.
It is fair to say that the Free Trade Agreement and the NAFTA have
caused a very significant evolution and a significant change in the economic
relationship between Canada and the United States and Mexico. It is wrong,
however, to say that prior to the Free Trade Agreement, we did not have any
trade between Canada and the United States, and that the Free Trade
Agreement itself has somehow caused this remarkably close and integrated
relationship between our two economies and countries. The process of
integration was already well underway before NAFTA. We have had ways of
dealing with trade disputes over a long period of time; none of them were
very satisfactory. We have had trade agreements, particularly the Auto Pact.2
We had historically a number of trade agreements between Canada and the
United States and, obviously, we have seen a significant reduction in tariffs
at the border over a long period of time.
Public opinion, which is what politicians worry about the most, reflects
these mixed emotions. If you were to ask most people on both sides of the
border, they would say that they like greater choice. They like the prosperity
of open markets. They have come to expect that, and they have no intention
of leaving that kind of a world for another model. It is really unthinkable,
somehow we would return, certainly in Canada, to some kind of an ocean of
heavily managed trade in which the government would attempt to reoccupy
or take back certain sectors which have over a period of forty or fifty years
been steadily left to the market. At the same time there is a concern, in both
the U.S. and Canada, about particular jobs. There is a concern about the
environment, and there is concern about identity.
Thomas Friedman's book3 talks about this competing desire that we have
inside ourselves for efficiency, for productivity, and for the best that
technology can bring. We desire continuing and complete access to this
world of ever-expanding technological change. At the same time, we have a
very deep concern about our own identities and our own cultures and our
own values. Often, when Canadians talk about culture, Americans accuse us
of reaching deep into the bag of protectionist tricks. Nevertheless, the
identity question, the cultural question, is deep and it is real. It is part of what
the Seattle phenomenon is all about. I do not pretend to understand
2 Canada-United States Automotive Products Agreement, 16 Jan. 1965, Can. T.S. 1966
No. 14.
3THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LExus AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING
GLOBALIZATION (1999).
3
Rae: The Politics of Cross Border Dispute Resolution
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2000
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
completely what the process is all about, or what the demonstrators in
Washington are expecting or hoping to achieve.
I want to talk about how these issues get resolved. Then, I would like to
talk about the softwood lumber dispute as an example.4 My general
observation would be this: it is very much in Canada's interest, because of its
relative size to the United States, because it is a smaller economy, because it
is a smaller country, because we are so dependent on trade and on access to
markets and, in particular, on access to the United States' market, it is in
Canada's interest always to have a comprehensive rules-based system in
place that allows us not simply to depend on the kindness or generosity of
our trading partner, but rather on the existence of clear rules, which are
enforceable, which are transparent, and whose adjudicative value is widely
and broadly accepted by parties to the dispute. Everyone in this room knows
far better than I do that this was what was promised as the grail that would be
achieved when we entered into the negotiations on free trade with the United
States. The promise was that while there would be a price in terms of
adjustment, while there would be a price in terms of particular jobs and
particular industries, at the end of the day we would be able to avoid getting
hit by surges in American protectionism or changes in the political mood in
the American Congress because we would have a binding mechanism to
resolve disputes, and that mechanism would be Canada's best protection.
I should say that as the son of a diplomat, and I have been called the son
of many other things, but that, in fact, is what I am. I always was brought up
to believe that Canada would most likely achieve that objective, not in a
uniquely bi-lateral relationship with the United States, but by insisting on
strong multi-lateral rules and multi-lateral institutions and I always follow
that logic myself. That is why the comments I heard earlier about the
relationship and the connection between the WTO and the NAFTA are so
important and that is why it is impossible for us now to talk of an exclusively
bi-national relationship or bi-national resolution of disputes between us,
because the WTO will enter into those relationships and those disputes every
step of the way and particularly when it comes to softwood lumber. I am
convinced the WTO is going to enter into the discussion fairly early on with
respect to the softwood lumber question.
Softwood lumber is fascinating, not only because I have been working at
it recently, and it has helped send my children to University, but because it is
the biggest sector working outside the principles of free trade between
Canada and the United States. I must say I was deeply heartened by Dick
Cunningham's remarks when he said this is going to go on and on and on. I
4 In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, ECC-94-1904-1
USA; Memorandum Opinions and Order, 3 Aug. 1994.
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appreciate that much more than I can readily say. It is the largest volume of
trade between our two countries that now operates outside the principles of
free trade, outside the principles of NAFTA, and I would argue, outside the
principles of the WTO. If we accept public education, health care, and social
services, where there are clear reasons on both sides of the border where
these are not seen as entirely marketable commodities, it is the most notable
exception. This is an exception that is increasingly problematic.
First of all, it is a very visible area of both of our economies. It is a multi-
billion dollar industry that involves the livelihoods of millions of people on
both sides of the border. It is key in every part of Canada and the United
States. It is not confined to one geographical area, certainly in the case of
Canada or in the case of the United States. As a resource sector, as well as a
manufacturing sector, there are clear questions about environment, clear
questions about sustainability, clear questions about public policy. There are
provocative issues of provincial and state autonomy and native rights. There
are interests in issues that make this one of the most compelling and most
contentious issues of trade between us.
Let us get down to brass tacks. Canada has thirty-five percent of the
lumber market in the United States. This is a larger share than we have in
virtually any other commodity, certainly any other commodity that is also
manufactured in the United States. This market share could well grow. There
are internal pressures on the United States to cut less wood on public lands,
for example. There has been significant public pressure in the United States.
Canada has a smaller economy. We have one-tenth of your population. We
have an enormous landmass, and we still have a lot of trees. The impetus for
protectionism began in the late 1970s. It is fair to say as long as there has
been lumber trade between Canada and the United States, which is close to
200 years, almost from the time of the earliest settlements, people were
trading in wood across both sides of the border. It is fair to say that at every
juncture, the issue of protectionism has risen again. But the most recent
round of protectionism began again in late 1970s. It was related to the
decline in American economy at that time.
As everyone here knows, the basic decision was made by a relatively
small group of American companies that the most visible, most effective way
to keep their prices high and to keep their market share high was to make
sure that Canadian products in their market were restricted. There were
attempts made through the early 1980s, some of which succeeded politically,
though never judicially. This is a subsidy that has never been found by an
authoritative public panel. Every time the issue has been taken out of the
American political stream, it has been found that there is no massive subsidy
of Canadian wood by the Canadian government. Certainly, I can tell you
5
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through my time as Premier, I never once met a leader of a forest products
company who came into my office and thanked me for the massive amounts
of money that the government of Ontario was giving to his company, the
result of which was that his business was becoming so much more profitable.
It was kept out of NAFTA discussions.
Softwood lumber was sacrificed on the altar of successful negotiations for
free trade between Canada and the United States. The only way in which a
fast track appeared to be possible was if it was specifically removed from the
conference. There is a strong sense that the lumber industry in the United
States has tremendous political clout in key states with key senators who are
able to put key pressure on the administration. So, we had Softwood Rounds
1, 2 and 3; and we now have a current system of volume controls, which we
call quotas. I do not know why this anomaly should be allowed to continue.
When I heard that Mr. Blanchard said that some other deal had to be
cooked up in 2001 when this agreement expires, I cannot say that I was
surprised to hear that, although I am disappointed. It seems to me that it is
really a terrible anomaly at a time when both our countries are pushing
forward on greater free trade for the Americas, when we pride ourselves on
having achieved this enormously significant breakthrough in terms of the
relationship between Canada and the United States, and in terms of the
volume of trade which crosses borders without conflict and without
disagreements to the advantage of all consumers. It seems so unfortunate that
anyone would be contemplating the renewal of what is essentially a closed
system that freezes markets, that rewards those who have or who once had a
particular market share at a particular time. Within Canada, quotas freeze
relations between provinces so that some provinces get more because they
had more five or ten or fifteen years ago, and others get less because they did
not have as much five or ten or fifteen years ago. Some are out, some are in.
If you have quotas, you have a significant advantage in the market share in
the United States. If you do not have market share, you do not have any
advantage. It is not transparent. In Canada, no one knows which companies
have which quota. It is politically unsustainable in Canada. It simply cannot
be sustained because of the resentment that grows among those companies
that do not have an adequate market share, or an adequate quota. I believe it
may be unsustainable in the United States, as well.
There is a new factor in the works with the American economy. A more
aggressive consumerism is emerging not simply from small players, but from
larger players as well. The most significant change in the economics of the
lumber industry in the recent past has been the emergence of large
companies, which purchase lumber. There is an enormous difference
between the range of small lumber dealers who have historically complained
[Vol. 26:63 2000]
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about the existence of quotas, who are angry about them and do not like
them, companies like Home Depot and Lowe's. From my experience, Home
Depot is not a small company, and it is going to be just as sophisticated and
just as tough about the impact of a cartel-driven quota system as General
Motors, Caterpillar, and others are about the possibility of there being steel
quotas. The existences of these large consumer interests are going to be a
new factor.
The other real factor now in the trading relationship in lumber, of course,
is the views and activity of people in the environmental community. It is not
clear to me exactly what impact they will have. It is not clear to me exactly
what their objective is. One of the ironic things that the environmental
community will have to come to terms with is that if their objective is to keep
Canadian lumber out of the U.S. market, it will put enormous pressure on
American public and private lands and on the American political system
regarding where else this lumber is going to come from.. If it is coming from
elsewhere around the world, why would anyone believe that environmental
practice of those companies are going to be any more pristine, or poor, or
subject to approval than those of their nearest trading partner?
Let me conclude by suggesting that our stake as a country is clear. Our
stake is in a rules-based outcome and not in another quota deal that I would
argue is increasingly unmanageable simply because of the number of
interests and parties who aspire to a place at the table. To suggest that it is
possible to simply manage another deal, given the pressures and intentions
that I have tried to describe, are unrealistic and undesirable.
I talked earlier about the WTO as well as our remedies under the
NAFTA. I do not think that Canadian industry should feel that it has no
remedy in the event that the usual and predictable propaganda of some of the
American industries are allowed to hold sway. We have been through these
fights before. We have, by and large, won them. We have lost them at the
negotiating table. We tend to win them through the rules-based process and
proceed to give them away under the argument that we are gaining some kind
of peace.
My view and the view of my clients are that this is wrong. It is simply
wrong for us to have the largest volume of trade in a resource sector between
these two countries taking place on a system that is not based on any rules,
that is not based on any comprehensive and fair assessment of what is
subsidy and what is not, what is environmentally acceptable and what is not,
but rather is based on the power of one particular political group to impose
its remedy and its solutions on others.
The quota-based system was the product not of one cartel, but effectively
of two. It took two interests to combine - to impose this agreement on
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consumers in the United States. I do not see why it should be sustained by
public policy. If we believe that the market should set prices; if we believe
that clear environmental rules and practices on both sides of the border are
entirely desirable and should be enforced, then let the process take place. Let
there be that genuine free and open process, let the two countries agree on
what is or is not a subsidy, and how best to protect the environment in both
countries. Failing that, let a bi-national panel determine whether or not,
indeed, there are subsidies and whether or not, indeed, there are problems
with the way in which Canada does business.
The fact that provinces have control over the land base, which is a
different way of doing business than in the United States, does not mean that
we do not have very transparent and clear rules with respect to taxes that
must be paid, fees that must be paid, and rules that must be followed with
respect to sustainability. Quite the contrary. Those rules are in place. They
are transparent. I would suggest that there are different ownership patterns on
both sides of the border. We have different systems in place. If you ask if
Ontario environmental rules compare with Louisiana's, if our enforcement
ability in the province of Quebec is comparable, and if stumpage rates are as
fair and reasonable as they are in states, which are essentially dominated by a
small number of privately held companies, my answer is clear: Canada's
rules and practices compare favorably. They could be improved. So could
those of the United States. If we cannot agree, let some neutral observer
determine that. I would not mind. Let the chips fall where they may, if you
pardon the expression. Let the issue be determined.
It seems to me that we can never remove politics from trade disputes. It is
only natural that people will attempt to create greater certainty through their
political institutions and attempt to exercise greater control through their
political institutions when faced with change, or when faced with
competition. But the whole purpose of trying to create rules, whether it is
through NAFTA or through the WTO, is to insist that the political system has
to exercise some restraint, and that the policies created by the political
system itself have to stand a test that is rules-based and that is not simply
based on power or on whim or on the changing vagaries of political and
public opinion. Most of us would feel that consumers are more likely to be
better served and the economies of both countries are more likely to be better
served by this approach than by an approach in which deals are worked out
between cartels. My reading of history tells me that deals worked out
between cartels do not tend to do the consumers any favor. They do not tend
to favor innovation. They do not tend to favor new investment and, frankly,
they do not tend to favor the environment. History would tend to point to
[Vol. 26:63 2000]
8
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 26 [2000], Iss. , Art. 15
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol26/iss/15
Rae-THE POLITICS OF CROSS-BORDER DISPUTE RESOLUTION 71
that, and that is what will occur with respect to competing issues in the
lumber industry between Canada and the United States.
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